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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 30, 1983, the Minneapolis City Council passed
what was labeled an innovative "civil rights" approach to combat-
t Randall D.B. Tigue is an attorney in private practice in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
He received his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota in 1970, and his
J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law School in 1973. From 1974 to 1976 he served
as legal counsel for the Minnesota affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union. He has
litigated numerous first amendment cases in the trial courts of the State of Minnesota, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States District Court, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
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ing pornography.' The ordinance was the brainchild of Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. 2 Within days of the passage of
the ordinance, the Executive Director of the Minnesota affiliate of
the American Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) termed the ordi-
nance a "constitutional mockery."' 3 The MCLU promised prompt
court action to challenge the ordinance if the Mayor of Minneapo-
lis signed it into law.
4
The opportunity for a court challenge never arose. On January
5, 1984, six days after passage of the ordinance, the measure was
vetoed by Minneapolis Mayor Donald M. Fraser.5 In his veto
message, the Mayor stated:
The remedy sought through the ordinance as drafted is neither
appropriate nor enforceable within our cherished tradition and
constitutionally protected right of free speech. The definition
of pornography in the ordinance is so broad and so vague as to
make it impossible for a bookseller, movie theatre operator or
museum director to adjust his or her conduct in order to keep
from running afoul of its proscriptions.
6
The Mayor of Minneapolis and the Executive Director of the
MCLU were correct. The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance7 was a
1. See Council passes pornography law, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Dec. 31, 1983, at IA,
col. 1, for an account of the passage of the ordinance. The ordinance passed the Minneap-
olis City Council by a vote of 7-6 after a lengthy and emotional debate concerning the
nature of pornography and the first amendment.
2. Catharine MacKinnon is an Associate Professor at the University of Minnesota
Law School. At the time the ordinance was proposed, Andrea Dworkin was a Visiting
Professor at the University of Minnesota.
3. See Head of state MCLUasks Fraser to veto pornography law, Minneapolis Star & Trib.,
Jan. 2, 1984, at IB, col. 1. The MCLU had been in contact with book sellers, publishers,
and lawyers willing to volunteer their services to fight the ordinance, arguing that even the
Bible would be subject to censorship under the ordinance. Id
4. Id
5. See Letter from Minneapolis Mayor Donald M. Fraser to Alice Rainville, Presi-
dent, Minneapolis City Council, and Council Members (Jan. 5, 1984) (veto message) (on
file with the Minneapolis City Council).
6. Id
7. Ordinance to amend MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES [hereinafter
cited as MCO] Title 7, chs. 139, 141 (1982) (passed Dec. 30, 1983; vetoed Jan. 5, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Ordinance]. The full text of the proposed ordinance is re-
printed in the Appendix to these Articles. See Appendix: The MacKinnon/Dworkin Pornogra-
phy Ordinance, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 119 (1985). The proposed ordinance will be
referred to in this Article as the "MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance," the "proposed ordi-
nance," or "the ordinance."
References to the "MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance" or the "proposed ordinance" in
this Article are to the proposed draft of the ordinance introduced to the Minneapolis City
Council on November 23, 1983, authored by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dwor-
kin. It is this draft which is reproduced in the Appendix to these Articles. See Appendi,
[Vol. I11
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constitutional mockery. Its purported use of the term "civil
rights" is incompatible with its remedy of censorship. In fact, had
a law school class been instructed to draft an ordinance pertaining
to regulation of sexually explicit material which deliberately vio-
lated every substantive and procedural principle of the first
amendment, it is difficult to see how the class could have improved
upon the measure passed by the Minneapolis City Council.
This Article will examine that proposed ordinance. The pur-
pose of the Article is to illustrate that civil rights and censorship
are indeed incompatible bedfellows. While no court has ruled on
the merits of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance, long-estab-
lished substantive and procedural principles of the first amend-
ment lead to the conclusion that such an ordinance is
unconstitutional. The ordinance's violation of first amendment
principles amounts to censorship. Material deserving first amend-
ment protection would be withheld from public scrutiny under the
ordinance. The Article will first examine the substantive and pro-
cedural provisions of the proposed ordinance." Second, the Article
will discuss the substantive first amendment violations of the ordi-
nance.9 It will demonstrate that the ordinance does not meet the
constitutional standards required for the prohibition of ideas. The
vagueness and overbreadth of the ordinance will be illustrated.
Third, several specific principles of constitutional law which the
ordinance violates will be examined.'0 Fourth, the Article will dis-
supra. After the draft was submitted, the Government Operations Committee of the Min-
neapolis City Council held public hearings on the proposed amendment. The Committee
reported the amendment favorably to the Council on December 22, by a 5-0 vote. The
Council passed the amendment on December 30, by a vote of 7-6. See Minneapolis,
Minn., City Council Official Proceedings, Dec. 30, 1983, at 1998-99 (on file with the Min-
neapolis City Council).
Mayor Fraser vetoed the amendment on January 5, 1984. See Minneapolis Star &
Trib., Jan. 6, 1984, at IA, col. 1. On January 13, 1984, the Council attempted unsuccess-
fully to override the veto.
A slightly altered version of the MacKinnon/Dworkin draft was reintroduced to the
Council on January 13, 1984, and was co-sponsored by four of the Council members.
Also, in January 1984, Mayor Fraser created the Ad Hoc Minneapolis Task Force on
Pornography. In addition to considering the revised draft of the MacKinnon/Dworkin
ordinance, the task force considered six proposed amendments to the Minneapolis civil
rights code that were designed to deal with pornography. The task force recommended its
own civil rights amendment which was considerably narrower than the MacKin-
non/Dworkin version. See Minneapolis Star & Trib., May 2, 1984, at 4B, col. 5.
8. See infba notes 13-51 and accompanying text.
9. See in fa notes 52-124 and accompanying text.
10. See inkfa notes 125-167 and accompanying text. The specific constitutional viola-
tions that will be discussed are: the ordinance's exemption for certain libraries and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; the ordinance's cause of action for
1985]
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cuss whether the ordinance falls within one of the recognized ex-
ceptions to the first amendment." Finally, the ordinance's




The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance was proposed as an
amendment to Chapters 139 and 141 of the Minneapolis Code of
Ordinances.1 3 The ordinance proposed to amend the existing civil
rights ordinance to create certain "special findings on pornogra-
phy.' 1 4 The special findings are factual findings which state the
effect pornography has on the civil rights of women.' 5 Among
these are the statements that pornography creates and maintains
the inequality of the sexes, that pornography promotes rape, bat-
tery, and prostitution, and that pornography generally prevents
women from fully exercising their various civil rights.16 The ordi-
nance intends to prohibit all discriminatory practices based on
pornography 17 and provide certain civil remedies for coercive acts
assault and the R. v. Hickh standard; and the absence of a scienter requirement in the
ordinance.
11. Sea infta notes 168-211 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 212-228 and accompanying text.
13. Chapter 139 of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances sets forth the substantive
provisions of the city's civil rights law. These substantive provisions include the prohibi-
tion of discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations based upon
race, religion, national origin, sex, and affectional preference. See MCO ch. 139 (1982).
Chapter 141 establishes the Department of Civil Rights, and sets forth the procedural
mechanism by which the substantive provisions of Chapter 139 are to be enforced. See
MCO ch. 141 (1982).
14. Proposed Ordinance § 1, to amend MCO § 139.10(a)(1).
15. Id The full text of the special findings reads as follows:
(1) Special Fidings on Pornography." The Council finds that pornography is central
in creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the sexes. Pornography is a
systematic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differ-
entially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it promotes, with the acts of
aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights in em-
ployment, education, property rights, public accommodations and public serv-
ices; create public harassment and private denigration; promote injury and
degradation such as rape, battery and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement
of laws against these acts; contribute significantly to restricting women from full
exercise of citizenship and participation in public life, including in neighbor-
hoods; damage relations between the sexes; and undermine women's equal exer-
cise of rights to speech and action guaranteed to all citizens under the
constitutions and laws of the United States and the State of Minnesota.
Id
16. Id
17. See id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(b)(2).
[Vol. 11
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based on pornography.' 8
A. Substantive Provisions
The ordinance provides several substantive provisions that an
individual could use to combat pornography. These include an
extensive definition of the word "pornography,"' 9 a section con-
cerning discrimination against women by trafficking in pornogra-
phy,20 and several legal remedies for certain acts related to
pornography.
2'
The ordinance defines the term pornography as "a form of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex."' 22 It further defines pornography
as "the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically de-
picted, whether in pictures or in words," provided that one or
more of nine descriptions or depictions also appear in the work.2 3
These descriptions include such things as women depicted as sex-
ual objects, women shown in positions of sexual submission, and
women shown as "whores by nature. ' 24
Sections (I)-(o) of the ordinance define substantive acts of dis-
18. See d § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(m)-(o). Three causes of action are provided
under the ordinance. Section (m) provides a cause of action to any person coerced into a
pornographic performance. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Section (n) pro-
vides a cause of action to any person who has pornography forced on her. See infia note 33
and accompanying text. Finally, section (o) provides a cause of action to any person who
is assaulted, physically attacked, or injured in any way that is directly caused by pornogra-
phy. See inqfa notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
19. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
20. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(1).
21. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(1)(3) (any woman has a cause of action "as a wo-
man acting against the subordination of women" for trafficking in pornography); id. § 4,
to add MCO § 139.40(m) (any person who is coerced into a pornographic performance
has a cause of action for damages and for the elimination of the material from public
view); id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(n) (any person who has pornography "forced on
him/her" has a cause of action); id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o) (any person who is
assaulted in a way that is caused by specific pornography has a cause of action for dam-
ages and for an injunction against further distribution or sale of the material); Id. § 2, to
add MCO § 141.60 (individual alleging violation may bring civil action).
22. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 13 9 .2 0 (gg).
23. Id
24. Id The ordinance defines "pornography" as follows:
Pornography. Pornography is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.
(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically
depicted, whether in pictures or words, that also includes one or more of the
following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities;
or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
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crimination through pornography. These sections also set forth
the civil remedies individuals have for various acts caused by por-
nography. Section (1) provides that trafficking in pornography is
discrimination against women under the civil rights law. 25 The
section has an exemption for public libraries funded by the city,
state, or federal government, as well as private or public university
or college libraries.26 Section (1) also prohibits the formation of
private clubs or associations for the purpose of trafficking in por-
nography and calls such clubs or associations "a conspiracy to vio-
late the civil rights of women. '27 The section provides that any
woman has a cause of action against pornographers for subordina-
tion.28 It further provides the same cause of action for any man or
transsexual who alleges injury by pornography "in the [same] way
women are injured by it."
'
29
Section (m) makes the coercing of a pornographic performance
a violation of the civil rights law.3 0 The section provides that any
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or
(vi) women's body parts--including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and but-
tocks--are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts; or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that
makes these conditions sexual.
(2) The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in (1) (i - ix)
above is pornography for purposes of subsections (1) - (p) of this statute.
Id
25. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(). Section () reads as follows:
() Discrimination by trafcking in pornography. The production, sale, exhibition, or
distribution of pornography is discrimination against women by means of traf-
ficking in pornography:
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public uni-
versity and college libraries in which pornography is available for study, includ-
ing on open shelves, shall not be construed to be trafficking in pornography but
special display presentations of pornography in said places is sex discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of trafficking in
pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy to violate the civil
rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting against the
subordination of women. Any man or transsexual who alleges injury by pornog-
raphy in the way women are injured by it shall also have a cause of action.
Id
26. Id. § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(1)(1). However, "special display presentations" of
pornography in such libraries would constitute discrimination. Id.
27. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40()(2).
28. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40()(3).
29. Id
30. ld § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(m). Section (m) reads as follows:
[Vol. I I
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person 3' who is coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced into
performing for pornography has a cause of action for damages
against the maker, seller, exhibitor, or distributor of the pornogra-
phy. A cause of action is also provided to eliminate the products
of the performance from public view.
32
Section (n) gives a person who has pornography forced on him
or her a cause of action against the perpetrator, and also against
any institution involved.
33
(m) Coercion into pornographic performances. Any person, including transsexual, who
is coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced (hereafter, "coerced") into per-
forming for pornography shall have a cause of action against the maker(s),
seller(s), exhibitor(s) or distributor(s) of said pornography for damages and for
the elimination of the products of the performance(s) from the public view.
(1) Limitation of action. This claim shall not expire before five years have elapsed
from the date of the coerced performance(s) or from the last appearance or sale
of any product of the performance(s), whichever date is later;
(2) Proof of one or more of the following facts or conditions shall not, without
more, negate a finding of coercion;
(i) that the person is a woman; or
(ii) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(iii) that the person has attained the age of majority; or
(iv) that the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone involved in or
related to the making of the pornography; or
(v) that the person has previously had, or been thought to have had, sexual
relations with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of
the pornography; or
(vi) that the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures for or with
anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making of the pornogra-
phy at issue; or
(vii) that anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given permission
on the person's behalf; or
(viii) that the person actually consented to a use of the performance that is
changed into pornography; or
(ix) that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events in question was
to make pornography; or
(x) that the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate actively in the
photographic sessions or in the sexual events that produced the pornography; or
(xi) that the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a willing-
ness to cooperate in the production of pornography; or
(xii) that no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making of the
pornography; or
(xiii) that the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
Id
31. "Person" is defined under section (m) as "any person, including [a] transsexual."
Id § 4, to add MCO § 13 9.40(m). The reason for the specific reference to "transsexuals" is
unknown; see also id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o), for a similar definition under the cause
of action for assault.
32. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(m).
33. Id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(n). Section (n) reads as follows:
(n) Forcing pornography on a person. Any woman, man, child, or transsexual who
has pornography forced on him/her in any place of employment, in education,
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Section (o) deals with the subject of assaults or physical attacks
resulting from pornography. 34 The section provides that any per-
son who is directly injured 35 by specific pornography can make a
claim for damages against the perpetrator 36 of the pornography.
37
Under section (o), an injunction may be issued to prohibit the fur-
ther exhibition, distribution or sale of the pornography. 38
B. Procedural Provisions
With one important exception, 39 the procedural provisions of
the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance are the same as those found
in Chapter 141 of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances. Chapter
141 details the procedures for enforcement of the civil rights
laws. 40 Chapter 141 requires a person who believes himself or her-
self to have been the victim of discrimination to file a complaint
with the director of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission. 4
The director then is authorized to make a preliminary investiga-
tion to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the
allegations of discrimination are well-founded. 42 If the director de-
termines that no probable cause exists, the director shall notify the
complainant and the respondent of his determination, and of the
complainant's right to appeal this decision to a review commit-
34. Id. § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o). Section (o) reads as follows:
(o) Assault or physical attack due to pornography. Any woman, man, child, or
transsexual who is assaulted, physically attacked or injured in a way that is di-
rectly caused by specific pornography has a claim for damages against the perpe-
trator, the maker(s), distributor(s), seller(s), and/or exhibitor(s), and for an
injunction against the specific pornography's further exhibition, distribution, or
sale. No damages shall be assessed (A) against maker(s) for pornography made,
(B) against distributor(s) for pornography distributed, (C) against seller(s) for
pornography sold, or (D) against exhibitors for pornography exhibited prior to
the enforcement date of this act.
Id.
35. Under section (o), an injury includes any assault, physical attack, or injury that is
directly caused by specific pornography. Id While this definition specifically applies to
physical injury, it is possible that it could also be interpreted to include mental or emo-
tional injury. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
36. Also liable for damages under section (o) are the "maker(s), distributor(s), seller(s)
or exhibitor(s)" of the pornography. Id.
37. Id
38. Id; see also id § 4, to add MCO § 13 9. 40 (p). Section (p) states that it is not a
defense to the provisions of the ordinance that the defendant did not know or intend that
the materials are pornography or sex discrimination.
39. See zifra note 50 and accompanying text.
40. MCO ch. 141 (1982).
41. Id § 141.50(a). The complaint must be filed within six months of the incident
giving rise to the complaint. Id
42. Id § 141.50(b).
[Vol. I I
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tee.43 The review committee may affirm or reverse the director's
decision, or send the complaint back to the director for additional
investigation.
44
If the director finds probable cause, he will attempt to conciliate
the matter.45 If conciliation cannot be accomplished, the com-
plaint shall be referred to the Civil Rights Commission.4 6 The
chairperson of the Civil Rights Commission shall designate a hear-
ing committee to evaluate the complaint.
4 7
If the hearing committee finds that the respondent has engaged
in discrimination, it is required to issue an order directing the re-
spondent to cease engaging in the discriminatory activity.
48 It
may also take any other affirmative action necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Law.
49
In addition to this pre-existing procedure, the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance would add the following provision to the
Minneapolis Code of Ordinances:
(3) Pornography." The hearing committee or court may order re-
lief, including removal of violative material, permanent injunc-
tion against the sale, exhibition or distribution of violative
material, or any other relief deemed just and equitable, includ-
43. Id § 141.50(d). The director's decision must be appealed within 15 days to the
review committee. Id The committee must consist of at least three members of the Min-
neapolis Civil Rights Commission. At least one of the three members of the review com-
mittee must be an attorney. Id
44. Id.
45. Id § 141.50(e).
46. Id
47. Id § 141.50(h). The committee must be established within 30 days of the referral
of the complaint to the Commission. The chairperson must designate three members of
the Commission to serve as the hearing committee. At least one of the members of the
hearing committee is required to be an attorney. Id
The hearings of the committee must be conducted in accordance with the Minnesota
Administrative Procedures Act. Id § 141.50(j)(1). The Minnesota Administrative Proce-
dures Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 14.01-.69 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as MAPA] instructs
agencies on the proper method of promulgating constitutionally acceptable rules, 1d
§§ 14.01-.36, and establishes procedures governing the promulgation of such rules. Id
§§ 14.48-.69. The public hearings conducted by the hearing committee regarding obscene
material are governed by the procedural requirements of MAPA. See MCO § 141.50(j) (1).
The committee, therefore, is required to make its hearings public, give sufficient notice to
interested parties, and make its decisions in writing in order to comply with MAPA.
MINN. STAT. §§ 14.58-.62. For a general discussion of MAPA and its requirements, see
Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Mnesota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151 (1979).
48. MCO § 141.50(1).
49. Id § 141.50(k)(1). Among the affirmative actions available to the hearing com-
mittee is an award of punitive damages. Punitive damages may be awarded in an amount
not less that $100 or more than $6000. Reasonable attorney's fees may also be awarded.
9
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ing reasonable attorney's fees. 50
Under the proposed ordinance, therefore, if a particular book,
magazine, or motion picture were found to be pornography, a
three-person committee could order the offending material perma-
nently barred from distribution within the city of Minneapolis.
5 1
III. THE ORDINANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW
Judicial interpretation has established several principles which
govern freedom of speech under the first amendment. 52 These
principles protect the rights of persons to speak freely in society.
53
It is against these principles that the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordi-
nance must be examined. Such an examination reveals that the
proposed ordinance is unconstitutional, since it unduly restricts so-
ciety's ability to transmit and receive certain types of speech. The
proposed ordinance violates three principles of first amendment
law: the prohibition of ideas, 54 vagueness,
55 and overbreadth. 56
50. Proposed Ordinance § 1, to add MCO § 141.50(l)(3). This procedural provision
is nominally a separate ordinance, introduced contemporaneously with the substantive
provisions.
51. See id. A publisher, seller, distributor, or exhibitor of material barred by the re-
view committee can seek judicial review in district court, pursuant to the Minnesota Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act. MCO § 141.160(b). For a discussion of the provisions of the
Minnesota Administrative Procedures Act, see supra note 47.
In addition to the administrative procedure provided for, the ordinance also autho-
rizes that any person alleging a violation of the ordinance may bring a direct civil action.
Proposed Ordinance § 2, to add MCO § 141.60(a). The ordinance does not specify what
court would be authorized to hear such claims. Presumably it would be the district court,
a court of general jurisdiction. The inability of a municipality to create subject matter
jurisdiction in the district court for a private cause of action is a separate infirmity of the
ordinance which is beyond the scope of this Article.
52. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 857 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. This Article will consider three of these first amend-
ment principles and how they relate to the proposed ordinances. These principles are: the
prohibition of ideas, see infta notes 57-83 and accompanying text; overbreadth, see infia
notes 84-116 and accompanying text; and vagueness, see infra notes 117-124 and accompa-
nying text.
53. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Justice Holmes spoke of the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech. The
premise of this theory is that the first amendment prohibits government from suppressing
ideas because the truth of an idea can best be determined in the marketplace of competing
ideas. Id; see also NOWAK, iupra note 52, at 864.
54. See infia notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
55. See infia notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
56. See injfa notes 84-116 and accompanying text.
[Vol. I11
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A. The Ordnance and the Prohibition of Ideas
One of the most firmly established principles of first amendment
law is that the expression of ideas through speech is protected.
57
Ideas, no matter how unpopular, come within the scope of pro-
tected speech provided for by the first amendment. 58 Certain
speech, however, has never been afforded protection under the first
amendment. 59 One example of unprotected speech is obscenity.
6°
The best means of examining the constitutionality of the pornog-
raphy definition in the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is to com-
pare that definition with the law of obscenity as it has been
developed by the United States Supreme Court. Since the
Supreme Court has established obscenity as the demarcation be-
tween protected and unprotected speech in the area of sexually
explicit communications, 61 the definition of obscenity can be used
as a benchmark to examine the constitutionality of the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance.
The seminal case holding that obscene speech is not entitled to
constitutional protection was Roth v. United Stales,62 decided in
1957. In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that all ideas, even those
having the slightest redeeming social value, are protected by the
first amendment.63 The first amendment, however, has never af-
57. See NOWAK, supra note 52, at 857-73.
58. See supra note 53; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
59. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libelous statements
made with "actual malice" are not afforded constitutional protection); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (words deemed to be "fighting words," which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, are
not afforded constitutional protection); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(words used in circumstances in which they present a "clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils Congress has a right to prevent" are not afforded
constitutional protection).
60. See Chaph7sky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. "Lewd and obscene" speech is within a "cer-
tain well-defined and narrowly limited class of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which [has] never . . . raise[d] any Constitutional problem." Id
61. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also infra notes 87-93 and accompa-
nying text.
62. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
63. Id at 484-85. In discussing the protection afforded to speech, the Supreme Court
stated that:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people. ...
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unortho-
dox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because
they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.
Id at 484 (footnote omitted).
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forded protection to obscene speech. 64  "Lewd and obscene"
speech is of such slight social value that it may be restricted. The
benefit that comes from such speech is outweighed by the social
interests in order and morality. 65 The Court defined obscene ma-
terial as material dealing with sex in a manner that appeals to
prurient interests.66 The term "prurient interests" was defined as
"material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. '67 The
Court in Roth thus distinguished ideas from obscenity. 68 Ideas, no
matter how disgusting, revolting, or even hateful, are entitled to
the full measure of constitutional protection. Obscenity, however,
is not entitled to the same protection.
The distinction between speech which advocates ideas and
speech which merely appeals to base, animalistic desires was high-
lighted even more clearly in Kigsley International Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the University of New York.69 In Kingsley International Pictures
Corp., New York State denied a license to exhibit the motion pic-
ture Lady Chatterley's Lover.70 The license was denied pursuant to a
statute permitting the denial of a license to a motion picture that
was obscene, indecent, or of such a character that its exhibition
would corrupt morals or incite criminal activity. 71 In holding the
license denial to be a violation of the first amendment, the
Supreme Court specifically addressed the New York court's justifi-
cation for the denial. The New York court justified the license
denial on the basis that the motion picture alluringly portrayed
adultery as normal behavior, rather than on the basis that the film
was "obscene" as defined by Roth.72 The Supreme Court stated
that what New York had done was to prevent the exhibition of a
motion picture because that picture advocated an idea-"that
adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. ' 73
64. Id at 484. The Court stated that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." Id.
65. Id According to the Roth Court, some ideas are not fully protected "because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests." Id.
66. Id at 487.
67. Id. at 487 n.20.
68. Id at 484-85.
69. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
70. Id at 685.
71. Id
72. Id at 687. Specifically, the lower court relied on that portion of the New York
statute requiring the denial of licenses to motion pictures that are immoral because they
portray acts of sexual immorality as desirable, acceptable patterns of behavior. Id at 687-
88.
73. Id at 688-89.
[Vol. I11
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The first amendment, however, guarantees the freedom to advo-
cate ideas. The New York court, therefore, had struck at the heart
of constitutionally protected liberty.
74
Since Roth and Kingsley International Pictures Corp., the Supreme
Court has not deviated from the principle according almost abso-
lute constitutional protection to the advocacy of ideas. 75 Lower
courts have also repeatedly held that ideas, even hateful ideas such
as the teachings of the American Nazi Party76 and literature advo-
cating the use of illegal drugs, 77 are protected by the first
amendment.
Judged by this standard, the MacKinnon/Dworkin definition of
pornography is unconstitutional. What makes sexually explicit
material pornography under the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance
is not its degree of sexual explicitness, not its appeal to prurient
interests, nor even its lack of social value. Rather, it is the content
of the ideas advocated by the material. 78  To fall within the ordi-
nance's definition of pornography material must not only be sexu-
ally explicit, but must also depict the subordination of women by
portraying women as dehumanized sexual objects, 79 as sexual ob-
jects who enjoy pain or humiliation, 0 as sexual objects who experi-
ence sexual pleasure in being raped,81 or as whores by nature.
82
74. Id
75. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the Court invalidated a
Chicago ordinance that prohibited the picketing of residential real estate, but created an
exemption for labor picketing. The Court held the ordinance constitutionally invalid,
since the sole basis for determining whether picketing was legal or illegal was the content
of the picket sign. The Court held that the ordinance infringed upon the right to express
any thought free from government censorship. Id at 95-96.
76. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605, 14 I1. Dec.
890, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (per curium), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
an injunction against the American Nazi Party to prevent it from conducting a demon-
stration in the village of Skokie, Illinois, which was populated by a number of survivors of
Nazi concentration camps. In Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978), the court invalidated three Skokie ordinances that prohibited the dissemi-
nation of racist literature, required special permits for demonstrations, prohibited march-
ing while in military uniforms, and required liability insurance for a Nazi parade.
77. See High O1' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035, 1041-43 (N.D. Ga. 1978),
afd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the court invalidated a law prohibiting the
dissemination of drug-related literature to minors.
78. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
79. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1)(i).
80. Id. § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1)(ii).
81. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(l)(iii).
82. Id § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1)(vii). Professor MacKinnon has explicitly
noted that the definition of pornography in the ordinance is idea-based. She has stated
that the definition of pornography "does not include .. .erotica, which is sexually ex-
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Thus, two books or motion pictures could portray the identical
amount of sexual explicitness and be identical in their appeal to
prurient interests and lustful thoughts, but still be treated differ-
ently under the ordinance if one depicted women in subordination
to men, while the other depicted men and women in a position of
equality. The former would be pornography and subject to legal
sanction under the ordinance. The latter would not. The content
of the idea advocated by the respective works is the only distin-
guishing factor between the two works. The first amendment pro-
hibits such a distinction.
83
B. The Ord'nance and the Overbreadth Doctrine
One of the most important substantive components of first
amendment law is the overbreadth doctrine. A statute is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad if its prohibitions can be applied to consti-
tutionally protected speech.8 4 Even if an individual is engaged in
an activity thai is not entitled to first amendment protection, a
statute or ordinance proscribing that conduct may still be over-
broad.8 5 If the individual's conduct could properly be proscribed
by a more narrowly drawn statute or ordinance, the individual
may raise the overbreath of the statute as a basis for invalidating
the statute or ordinance.8
6
plicit sex premised on equality." Memorandum of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin to the Minneapolis City Council at 5 (Dec. 26, 1983) (on file with the Minneapo-
lis City Council).
83. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
84. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974), in which the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance which proscribed the use of "opprobrious language."
The Court held that the term went beyond the "fighting words" exception to the first
amendment and was overbroad. Id; see also NOWAK, supra note 52, at 867-71 (general
overview of the overbreadth doctrine).
85. NOWAK, supra note 52, at 868.
86. Id For cases outlining both the substantive overbreadth doctrine and the stand-
ing rule, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(regulation on charitable solicitation by a political organization held overbroad); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (law relating to breach of the peace invalidated; specifically
holding that the parties had standing to attack the laws without demonstrating that their
own conduct could not be regulated by a more narrowly drawn statute); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1963) (enforcement of Louisiana's Subversive Activity and Commu-
nist Control Law enjoined on the ground that the statute was susceptible of being applied
to plaintiffs civil rights workers' protected first amendment activities); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia law prohibiting attorney solicitation invalidated on the
ground that it was susceptible to application to plaintiffs' protected speech in recruiting
plaintiffs for civil rights actions). For cases limiting the applicability of the overbreadth
doctrine, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (statute prohibiting child pornogra-
phy held not unconstitutionally overbroad); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
[Vol. I11
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The overbreadth of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is ap-
parent on two levels. Most obvious is the fact that the ordinance
exceeds the standard set forth by the Supreme Court for regulating
sexually explicit material. In Miller v. California, 7 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the inherent dangers of regulating any form
of expression. Statutes designed to regulate obscene materials
must be carefully limited. 8 The Court confined the scope of regu-
lation of obscenity to material that depicts or describes sexual con-
duct. 9 This sexual conduct must be specifically defined by
statute. °
The Miller court established three guidelines that must be met
by a trier of fact when regulating sexually explicit material. First,
the trier of fact must ascertain whether "the average person, ap-
plying contemporary community standards," would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. 9 ' Second, the
trier of fact must ascertain whether the work "depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way," sexual conduct that is specifically de-
fined by state law. 92 Finally, the trier of fact must determine
whether the work as a whole "lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value."
'9 3
The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance exceeds the permissible
scope of regulation of sexually explicit materials to which states
are constitutionally confined under Miller. In fact, the ordinance
incorporates none of the Miller requirements. It does not require
the depiction of specific sexual acts in a patently offensive way. It
does not require that the work, taken as a whole, when viewed by
the average person, appeal to the prurient interest. Nor does it
evaluate material by its serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value. Given the fact that anything which does not fall within
the Miller definition is presumed to be entitled to constitutional
protection, the pornography definition contained in the MacKin-
(Court refused to apply overbreadth doctrine to a statute limiting political contributions
by a public employee, stating that the action did not involve pure speech and that the
overbreadth was not substantial).
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
88. Id at 23-24.
89. Id
90. Id The conduct can be specifically defined either in the statute, or as construed
by the courts.
91. Id at 24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
92. Id.
93. Id The Court expressly rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test
of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 461 (1966). 413 U.S. at 24-25.
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non/Dworkin ordinance is susceptible of application to protected
speech. The ordinance, therefore, is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Second, even assuming the Supreme Court would create an ex-
ception for pornography which depicts the subordination of wo-
men similar to that created for child pornography,94 such an
exception would not solve the ordinance's overbreadth problems.
In New York v. Ferber,95 the Supreme Court established an excep-
tion to the overbreadth doctrine for child pornography. In Ferber,
a New York criminal statute prohibited persons from knowingly
promoting sexual performances by children under the age of six-
teen by distributing material which depicted such performances.
96
There was no requirement of patent offensiveness, appeal to pruri-
ent interest, or lack of serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value in the statute. However, the statute did require, as a
prerequisite for criminal liability, the actual live performance of a
sex act by a child under the age of sixteen in order for criminal
liability to attach. The Court rejected an overbreadth challenge
because the statute did not reach a substantial number of imper-
missible applications.97 While the Court expressed concern that
the statute may prohibit some speech which is protected by the
first amendment, it noted that this prohibition would amount to
only a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach.98
Other methods could also be used to circumvent the statutory re-
quirement of the actual use of children in the material, thereby
limiting the application of the statute. 99
94. See Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
95. Id
96. Id. at 749-50.
97. Id. at 771.
98. Id at 773. The Court stated .that:
We consider this the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications .... While the reach of the stat-
ute is directed at the hard core of child pornography, the Court of Appeals was
understandably concerned that some protected expression, ranging from medical
textbooks to pictorials in the National Geographic would fall prey to the statute.
How often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct
clearly within the reach of [the statute] in order to produce educational, medical,
or artistic works cannot be known with certainty. Yet we seriously doubt, and it
has not been suggested, that these arguably impermissible applications of the
statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's
reach.
Id.
99. Id at 762-63. The Court specifically noted that:
The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de mintmis.
We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts
or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an important and nec-
[Vol. I11
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/4
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CENSORSHIP
The overbreadth problem in Ferber was insubstantial because
the statute required the actual sexual abuse of children in the pro-
duction of the material in order for criminal penalties to attach. 00
It is readily apparent from the Ferber Court's analysis that mere
verbal descriptions of children engaging in sexual activity, draw-
ings of children engaged in sexual activity, simulations of children
engaged in sexual activity, or acts performed by persons over the
statutory age who look like children, could not be constitutionally
prohibited unless the work otherwise fell within the Mi//er
standards. 10 1
By contrast, the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance would pro-
hibit material involving adults which the Ferber Court refused to
prohibit even when the material involved children.1 0 2 The Mac-
Kinnon/Dworkin ordinance does not require that a woman actu-
ally be subjected to sexual abuse in the production of a work
before the work may be considered pornography. A mere simula-
tion, drawing, or verbal description of such abuse will render a
work pornographic and subject to legal sanctions.10 3 The problem
is further aggravated by the fact that a depiction of sexually ex-
plicit subordination of women may be pornography under the or-
dinance, whether the depiction be in pictures or in words. 10 4
Thus, a single verbal description of a woman being subjected to
sexual abuse can render a work pornographic and therefore sub-
ject to the ordinance's sanctions. This is true regardless of the lit-
erary, artistic, political, or scientific value of the work.
Such an approach to restricting sexually explicit material has
been rejected by the Supreme Court ever since Roth. 0 5 The stan-
dard of obscenity before Roth judged material solely by the effect
essary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work. As a state
judge in this case observed, if it were necessary for the literary or artistic value, a
person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.
Simulation outside the prohibition of the statute could provide another alterna-
tive. Nor is there any question here of censoring a particular literary theme or
portrayal of sexual activity. The First Amendment interest is limited to that of
rendering the portrayal somewhat more 'realistic' by utilizing or photographing
children.
Id (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 760.
101. Id. at 764-65.
102. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
103. Id § 3, to add MCO § 13 9 .2 0(gg)(1). For the full text of the definition of pornog-
raphy, see supra note 24.
104. Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139 .20(gg)(1).
105. See supra note 63. All ideas, even those having the slightest social value, are pro-
tected under Roth. 354 U.S. at 484.
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isolated excerpts had upon unusually susceptible persons.10 6 Roth,
however, rejected this standard since it could encompass material
entitled to first amendment protection. 10 7 The Roth Court re-
placed the old standard with one that considers community-wide
factors. 08 The current standard examines the material as a whole,
and applies contemporary community standards, rather than con-
sidering the effect an isolated passage has upon a susceptible
person. 09
The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance does precisely what the
Supreme Court rejected in Roth. It permits a work to be deprived
of constitutional protection solely on the basis of a single isolated
passage, rather than considering the work as a whole."10 The over-
breadth problems involved in such an application of the ordinance
are substantial. The mystery novel which contains a single
description of a rape to be solved by police becomes pornography
under the ordinance. The rape scene between Rhett Butler and
Scarlett O'Hara in Gone With the Wind, and Winston Smith's rape
fantasy during Hate Week in George Orwell's 1984, become por-
nography under the ordinance.
Perhaps the most ironic victim of the overbreadth of the MacK-
innon/Dworkin ordinance would be Linda Marchiano,111 one of
the principal witnesses on behalf of the ordinance. 12 Ms. Marchi-
ano's book Ordeal,' 3 in which she alleges that her former husband
forced her into prostitution through repeated acts of physical vio-
lence, would constitute pornography under the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance.'14
Portions of Ms. Marchiano's book could be considered subordi-
106. R. v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360. See infta note 143 for the Hicklin standard.
107. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
108. Id at 490.
109. Id See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
110. The ordinance, in its provisions imposing civil liability for sexual assault caused
by specific pornography, adopts the most susceptible persons standard of the Hicklin test
and is therefore unconstitutional for that reason. See Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add
MCO § 139.40(o). For a more complete discussion of this issue, see infra notes 142-59 and
accompanying text.
111. Formerly "Linda Lovelace" of the film Deep Throat.
112. For an account of Ms. Marchiano's testimony, see Pornography class led to protest,
.film star visit, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Dec. 10, 1983, at IB, col. 1.
113. L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1983).
114. For example, at one point in the book, Ms. Marchiano describes how her husband
presided over her forcible rape by five men. The precise description in the book is as
follows:
The three animals who had come on first cared about nothing but getting
their jollies. I can no longer remember their faces. They never talked to me
[Vol. I11
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nation of a woman, graphically described in words, in which a
woman is presented as a dehumanized sexual object, as a sexual
object mutilated or physically hurt, and in a scenario of degrada-
tion, injury, abasement, or torture, in a context that makes these
conditions sexual.' 15 Had the ordinance been enacted, Ms. Mar-
chiano's own book could have been declared pornographic, and
she could have been subjected to legal sanctions.'
16
In contrast to the child pornography statute in Ferber, the over-
breadth in the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is real and sub-
stantial. It can be applied to protected speech, even to the speech
of the most ardent supporters of the ordinance itself. That fact
alone is compelling evidence of the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance.
C The Ordnance and Constitutznal Vagueness
A first amendment doctrine closely related to overbreadth is
that of vagueness.' 17 Any statute affecting first amendment rights
which is drafted in a manner so vague that persons of common
intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion will be invalidated for vagueness."t 8
directly. They talked to each other over and around me, as though I was a piece
of meat.
Most of the time my eyes were tightly closed. They didn't mind. They were
so into getting their rocks off that they wouldn't have cared if I was an inflatable
plastic doll, a puppet. They picked me up and moved me here and there; they
spread my legs this way and that; they shoved their things at me and into me.
Three of the animals were constant and persistent, always coming at me,
not even resting between times. The other two would back off from time to time.
Two of the men got their biggest thrill by working themselves up to the point of
coming and then shooting their sperm all over my body and rubbing it in.
Id at 36-37.
115. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg)(1).
116. Speculation that this might occur if the proposed ordinance were enacted is
hardly fanciful. Under Section (o), if a man read the above passage describing the actions
of Ms. Marchiano's husband and was inspired to commit the same acts against a woman,
the woman would have a cause of action against Ms. Marchiano and against the book-
store where the perpetrator bought the book. It is not inconceivable that an attorney
representing a victim of such a sexual assault would attempt to sue every defendant he or
she possible could, especially the ones with deep pockets.
117. NOWAK, supra note 52, at 871.
118. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). In Papachn'tou, the
Court held a disorderly conduct statute void for vagueness since it failed to give a person
of ordinary intelligence notice that his conduct was forbidden by statute, and because it
encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Id at 162. The Court held that
"Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that '[all persons]
are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands or forbids.' " Id (quoting
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
1985]
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In condemning vagueness involving first amendment freedoms,
the Supreme Court has held that vague laws violate several impor-
tant values."19 First, vague laws are a trap for the innocent. 120 A
law should provide a person with a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited. Vague laws fail to provide this reason-
able opportunity. Second, vague laws delegate basic policy deci-
sions to enforcement personnel on an ad hoc basis. This promotes
the arbitrary enforcement of the law. 12' Finally, vague laws oper-
ate to inhibit first amendment freedoms by not clearly defining
what is prohibited. 122 Persons must steer wide of the "unlawful
zone" under a vague statute. Under a clearly defined statute such
inhibition is not required.
23
The vague and undefined terms in the definition of pornogra-
phy under the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance are nearly limit-
less. It is difficult to ascertain what conduct would constitute
subordination of a woman. 124 Equally unclear is the extent to
which a depiction or description must go before it becomes sexu-
ally explicit. Also, persons of common intelligence can and neces-
119. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). In discussing the
values violated by vague laws, the Court stated:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man
is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a
vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it
'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevi-
tably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly marked.




123. See id For other cases dealing with first amendment vagueness, see Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (flag-misuse statute held unconstitutionally vague); Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance restricting right of free assembly held
unconstitutionally vague); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)
(ordinance establishing standards for determining suitability of films for young persons
held unconstitutionally vague); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (statute requiring
state employees to take oath swearing undivided allegiance to the United States govern-
ment held unconstitutionally vague); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (statute
regulating legal profession held an impermissible restraint on free speech).
124. During the public debate on the ordinance, one audience member rhetorically
asked whether the "missionary position" would qualify as subordination of women.
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sarily will differ as to what constitutes a woman being presented as
a dehumanized sexual object.
The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance could produce the adverse
effects attributed to vague laws. The lack of clarity in the defini-
tion of pornography would necessarily lead to arbitrary decisions
by the Minneapolis Civil Rights Department and judges in decid-
ing which books, magazines, and motion pictures to censor. Simi-
larly, the very vagueness of these definitions could cause
booksellers, publishers, and exhibitors to steer wide of the unlawful
zone. This would deter them from distributing material which
deals with the subjects of sex and women for fear of the adverse
consequences which might follow. The danger of arbitrary and
capricious enforcement of vague laws, and the danger of persons
too fearful of that arbitrary enforcement to publish or distribute
controversial works, are far greater threats to society than Deep
Throat will ever be.
IV. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIBRARY EXEMPTION AND THE
FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Under the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance, certain public and
private libraries would be exempt from the ordinance's sanc-
tions.' 25 Pornographic material available for study at such librar-
ies is not considered discrimination against women under the
ordinance.1 26 The unconstitutionality of this section stems from its
discriminatory treatment of persons who sell pornography. Under
this section, a proprietor of a bookstore who charges money for
pornography is subject to civil liability. 127 A library that lends the
same material at no charge, however, is immune from liability.1
28
Even assuming that pornography, as defined by the ordinance, is
totally without first amendment protection, the exemption of li-
braries from the ordinance's sanctions violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
29
125. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(l)(1). The ordinance grants to
any "[c]ity, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public university
and college libraries in which pornography is available for study" an exemption from the
sanctions provided in the ordinance. Id.
126. Id "Special display presentations" of pornography in such libraries would consti-
tute discrimination. Id
127. See id § 4, to add MCO § 139.40().
128. See id. § 4, to add MCO § 139.40()(1).
129. The equal protection clause states that: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Obscenity statutes and ordinances containing similar exceptions
have repeatedly been held unconstitutional. In People v. Wrench,' 30
the court considered the validity of a penal statute which made it
an affirmative defense to a charge of obscenity that the obscene
materials were being furnished to persons who had a scientific, ed-
ucational, or governmental justification for possessing them. In or-
der to preserve the constitutionality of the ordinance, the court
held that the ordinance must be construed to justify the sale of
allegedly obscene materials to all consenting adults. The court
could find no rational basis for allowing only persons with Ph.D's
and high IQ's to possess such material.13'
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Luck,' 32
held unconstitutional a provision in a Louisiana statute exempting
schools, churches, museums, and medical clinics from its state ob-
scenity law.' 33 The court held the exemption provision to be a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court could find no rational basis reasonably related to
a valid governmental purpose for allowing colleges and medical
clinics to sell pornography for commercial gain, while prohibiting
a bookstore from engaging in the same activity.
34
130. 83 Misc. 2d 95, 371 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1975).
131. Id at 97, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 837. The court held that the statute must be construed
to apply to the average individual engaged in intellectual pursuits, no matter how stimu-
lating those pursuits might be. A seller of such material has just as much right to sell it to
a "student of the school of hard knocks" as he does to a recognized intellectual. Id at 99,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39. The fact that a profit was derived from the sale or that the
subject matter was intended to entertain did not deprive the material of its constitutional
protection. Id. at 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
132. 353 So. 2d 225 (La. 1977).
133. Id at 230-32. The exemption provision read as follows:
The provisions of this section do not apply to recognized and established schools,
churches, museums, medical clinics, hospitals, physicians, public libraries, gov-
ernmental agencies, quasi-governmental sponsored organizations and persons
acting in their capacity as employees or agents of such organization. For the
purpose of this paragraph, the following words and terms shall have the respec-
tive meanings defined as follows:
(1) Recognized and established schools means schools having a full time faculty
and pupils, gathered together for instruction in a diversified curriculum.
(2) Churches means any church, affiliated with a national or regional
denomination.
(3) Physicians means any licensed physician or psychiatrist.
(4) Medical clinics and hospitals mean any clinic or hospital of licensed physi-
cians or psychiatrists used for the reception and care of the sick, wounded or
infirm.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106(D) (West 1974) (subdivision D was modified slightly in
1983 in a manner not affecting its constitutionality, but to date has not been repealed by
the legislature).
134. 353 So. 2d at 232. The court held the statute unconstitutional because the statute
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The Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a similar exemption
in a Duluth obscenity ordinance. In City of Duluth v. Sarette,135 a
provision of a Duluth obscenity ordinance exempted schools,
churches, medical clinics, hospitals, libraries, and government
agencies from its coverage.1 36 The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that providing total immunity for particular groups and institu-
tions, regardless of their use of obscene material, resulted in arbi-
trary and overbroad classifications. 37 Such classifications had no
relation to any legitimate government purpose.
38
In both Luck and Sarette, the courts, while invalidating the ex-
emption provisions, refused to invalidate the underlying statute or
ordinance. 139 The courts' basis for severing the exemption provi-
sion was their determination that the intent of the exemption was
to protect material which had serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. This protection was already provided, however,
under the definition of obscenity found in Miller. The exemption
was therefore unnecessary, and the provisions could be severed
without defeating the intent of the legislative bodies. 14°
In contrast, no exemption is provided under the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance for works which have serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value. Therefore, no legitimate
purpose exists for allowing libraries to lend such material. As a
result, a court would have no choice but to invalidate the entire
statutory provision in question.141
exempted certain institutions trafficking in hard-core pornography or obscene material for
commercial purposes while making such conduct criminal for anyone else. Id.
135. 283 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979).
136. Id. at 535. The ordinance allowed exemptions for such organizations regardless of
the use to which the obscene material was put by the organization.
137. Id. at 536. The court was disturbed by the use of tax exempt status as a distinc-
tion, because the characteristic was too nebulous.
138. Id The court saw no rational basis in using the amount of publicly donated funds
as a distinction between organizations.
139. See Luck, 353 So. 2d at 232-33; Saretie, 283 N.W.2d at 536-37. In Sarette, the court
held that striking down the exemption provisions would not alter the intended effect of the
ordinance, which was to regulate material covered by the M/iler standards. 283 N.W.2d at
537.
140. See Luck, 353 So. 2d at 232-33; Sarete, 283 N.W.2d at 536-37.
141. See Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 49 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147
N.W.2d 358 (1966), in which the court held it to be beyond its constitutional power to
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V. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT-A RETURN
TO R. V. HICKLIN
One of the most serious attacks on the first amendment put
forth by the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is the provision cre-
ating a civil cause of action for victims of sexual assault caused by
pornography. 142 The cause of action for sexual assault is, in effect,
a return to a standard of obscenity which the Supreme Court has
rejected for over thirty years.
The Supreme Court in Roth explicitly rejected the R. v. Hickin143
standard, which measured obscenity by the impact an isolated
passage in a particular work has upon the person most susceptible
to the influence of the passage. 144 The Court reasoned that by
judging obscenity upon the reaction of the most susceptible person
rather than the average person, "material legitimately [dealing]
with sex" would be subject to censorship.
1 45
In rejecting the Hicklin standard, the Supreme Court has gone so
far as to reverse a conviction under the average person test of
Roth 146 and Miller14 7 where the jury was instructed that children
could be included within the community by which prurient inter-
est and patent offensiveness are to be judged.1 48 In holding the
jury instruction unconstitutional, the Court in Pinkus v. United
States'49 noted that the effect of such an instruction would be to
reduce the adult population to reading only material that is fit for
children. 150
In fact, section (o) of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is far
142. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o).
143. [1868] 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360. The Hickh standard of obscenity judged material solely
by the effect an isolated passage had upon unusually susceptible individuals. Se supra
notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
144. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489; see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
145. Similarly, in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute which prohibited the sale of material "tending to incite minors to violent
or depraved or immoral acts," or "manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth," even if such material were sold to adults. Id at 381. The Court held the statute
unconstitutional since the effect of the provision would be "to reduce the adult population
of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children." Id at 383.
146. 354 U.S. at 476.
147. 413 U.S. at 5.
148. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978).
149. Id
150. Id. at 298 (citing Butler, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). Under such a jury instruction,
a conscientious jury would be inclined to lower the community standard by which obscen-
ity is judged. Such a reduction in the obscenity standard would eliminate some material
from first amendment protection that would normally be protected. Id at 297-98.
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more restrictive of first amendment rights than the statutes in
Hich'n or Pznkus. Under section (o), any person sexually assaulted
by someone who is inspired by a passage from a book to commit
the assault would have a civil cause of action.15' That single act
could result in damages being assessed against the distributor, au-
thor, publisher, or retailer of the book. 152 Also, an injunction
could be issued prohibiting the work from being distributed any-
where in the community. 53 The reaction of the most degenerate
reader or viewer in society could determine what the remainder of
the population would be permitted to read. If it is unconstitu-
tional to restrict the reading material of the general population on
the basis of the reaction of the person most susceptible to a pruri-
ent appeal, certainly the "pervert's veto" which could result from
section (o) of the ordinance must also be considered unduly
restrictive.
While not ruling on the precise issue raised by the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance, numerous courts have held that any at-
tempt to impose civil liability on the basis of the violent reaction of
a single person to a published work violates the first amendment.
Several courts have dismissed actions seeking to impose civil liabil-
ity upon television networks on the basis of the reaction of a single
viewer to certain programming. Such actions have involved a fif-
teen-year-old boy shooting and killing an eighty-three-year-old
neighbor, allegedly due to television violence; 54 a rapist allegedly
modeling his attack after a rape scene on a television special; 55
and a young boy killing himself by attempting to copy a stunt
shown on the Tonight Show. ' 56 In each of these cases, the court held
151. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139. 4 0(o); supra note 34 (full text of sec-
tion (o)).
152. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(o).
153. Id
154. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
The Zamora court held that to impose such a broad legal duty upon the media would not
only be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering effect on our economy.
To impose liability on the media for such actions would open the doors to an indetermi-
nate amount of liability. Id at 202.
155. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1981). The court held that the central concern of the first amendment in the area of
motion pictures is that there be a "free flow from creator to audience of whatever message
a film . . . might convey." Id at 493, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891-92 (citing Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The court also held that
the electronic media is entitled to the same first amendment protections. Id. at 493, 178
Cal. Rptr. at 892.
156. DeFillippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982). To impose
self-censorship upon a television station would not only violate their right to make pro-
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that to allow a single, isolated reaction to a television program to
govern the content of future programming would lead to self-
censorship. 
57
The same flawed theory underlies the MacKinnon/Dworkin or-
dinance. Just as the reaction of a single minor cannot form the
basis of a damage award, 58 so the reaction of a single rapist can-
not form the basis of a damage award against a bookseller and
permanently deprive the public of the right to view the
material. 159
VI. THE ABSENCE OF SCIENTER AS A DEFENSE TO CIVIL
LIABILITY
An established principle of first amendment law is that criminal
liability cannot be imposed upon a publisher, retailer, or distribu-
tor of obscene material in the absence of the element of scienter or
knowledge of the nature and contents of the material. 60 The ab-
sence of a requirement of scienter in the MacKinnon/Dworkin or-
dinance renders the ordinance unconstitutional.
In Smith v. Califom'a, 161 the Supreme Court discussed the scienter
gramming decisions, but would also violate the paramount rights of the viewers to access
to other ideas and experiences. Id. at 1041-42; see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
157. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 206; Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr.
at 892; DeFilhppo, 446 A.2d at 1041.
158. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp at 199.
159. Most directly on point with the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983), in which the plaintiff sought to
impose strict liability or, in the alternative, recover under the theory of negligent publica-
tion, as the result of the publication of an allegedly inflamatory magazine article which
resulted in the death of plaintiff's son and brother. The court held that either theory
would constitute an impermissible restriction of first amendment rights. Id at 804.
The proposed ordinance would, in fact, result in an even greater chill upon first
amendment rights than would the theory of the plaintiff in Olivia N The plaintiff in Olivia
N sought liability based upon negligence which would have to be proven at trial. 126
Cal. App. 3d at 448, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 888. Under the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance,
liability would be absolute upon proving that the material fell within the definition of
pornography and that it directly caused the sexual assault, regardless of the negligence or
culpability of the bookseller who sold the work. Unlike Oivia N., the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance permits not only money damages, but actually permits total re-
straint by enjoining further distribution of the subject work. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to
add MCO § 139.40(/)-(o).
160. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (prosecutor need only show that
a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the material he distributed, and that he
knew the character and nature of the materials); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)
(ordinance making seller of obscene books criminally liable without knowledge of the
book's contents held unconstitutional).
161. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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requirement. The Court invalidated an ordinance imposing strict
criminal liability for obscenity upon a bookseller, regardless of the
bookseller's knowledge of the contents of the material in ques-
tion. 62 The Court noted that dispensing with the requirement of
knowledge of the contents of a book on the part of a seller would
result in a severe limitation on the public's access to constitution-
ally protected matter.1 63 Because such an ordinance would require
a bookseller to restrict himself to selling only those books he had
actually inspected, the amount of material available to the public
would necessarily be limited.
64
The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance does not require scienter
before liability can be imposed. Section (p) of the ordinance spe-
cifically states that it is not a defense to an action arising under the
ordinance that the defendant did not know or intend that the
materials constituted pornography or sex discrimination. 165
It makes no difference that Smith v. California deals with criminal
as opposed to civil liability. The Supreme Court has recognized
that the imposition of civil liability can be every bit as chilling on
the exercise of first amendment rights as the imposition of criminal
penalties. 66 In fact, the chilling effect of civil damage awards has
led the Supreme Court to reject strict civil liability for defamation
of public figures. 167 To impose strict civil liability for pornography
regardless of the defendant's scienter similarly violates first amend-
ment rights. The threat of severe civil sanctions would lead book-
sellers and exhibitors to confine their exhibition or sale of materials
to those which they have personally examined. Such self-censor-
ship limits the public's access to protected first amendment
material.
162. See id at 154-55.
163. Id at 153.
164. Id The Court noted that removing the scienter requirement would have the ef-
fect of penalizing booksellers even though they did not have the slightest notice of the
contents of the book. Removing the scienter requirement would also impose severe limita-
tions on the public's access to constitutionally protected material. Id In the case of child
pornography involving the actual abuse of children, the Court has held that no criminal
liability can be imposed in the absence of scienter. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (1982).
165. Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO § 139.40(p).
166. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (Alabama civil
law of libel declared a greater threat to newspaper's first amendment rights than criminal
sanctions).
167. See id. at 277.
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VII. THE ORDINANCE AND THE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Proponents of the ordinance have attempted to justify its provi-
sions by analogy to several recognized exceptions to the first
amendment. These exceptions include group libel, 168 speech in-
volving a clear and present danger, 6 9 and commercial speech.
70
An examination of these exceptions reveals that none justify the
measures taken in the ordinance.' 
7
A. Group Libel
One of the most popular justifications for the MacKin-
non/Dworkin ordinance has been the "group libel" theory based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Beauhamais v. Illinos.'72 In
Beauharnais, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction under an Il-
linois criminal libel statute.1 73 The defendant was convicted of
distributing a leaflet urging the Mayor and City Council of Chi-
cago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment, and invasion
of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the
Negro."'1 74 Beauharnai's, however, is not a first amendment case.
The majority opinion in Beauhamais is based on the fourteenth
168. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). For a discussion of Beauharnas,
see infra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
169. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For a discussion of the clear and
present danger exception, see infi/a notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
170. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973). For a further discussion of the commercial speech exception, see bnfra notes
200-11 and accompanying text.
171. As previously noted, the obscenity and child pornography exceptions are unavail-
ing. See generally supra notes 56-116 and accompanying text. The definition of pornogra-
phy contained in the ordinance does not fall within the definition of obscenity contained
in Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (1973), or the child pornography exception as outlined in Ferber,
458 U.S. at 771.
172. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
173. Id. at 251. The statute provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, offer
for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or
exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibi-
tion exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, deri-
sion, or obloquy or otherwise is productive of breach of peace or riots ....
Id
174. Id. at 252. The leaflet further stated that "If the persuasion and the need to pre-
vent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the Negro will not unite us, then the
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amendment. 175
There are two reasons why the group libel theory cannot justify
the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance. First, support for the Beau-
harnais decision has been substantially eroded, both in the
Supreme Court and in lower federal courts. Twelve years after
Beauhamais, the Supreme Court eliminated one of the decision's
underlying presumptions: that the first amendment does not re-
strict libel in civil cases.1 76 Thereafter, the Court reversed a crimi-
nal libel conviction, explicitly holding that the first amendment
does restrict criminal libels, notwithstanding language to the con-
trary in Beauharnas. 177 Two years later, a unanimous Court invali-
dated a common law offense of criminal libel on first amendment
grounds without mentioning Beauhamais.1
78
Just as the Supreme Court has failed to give precedential value
to Beauhamais, the lower federal courts have also minimized its im-
portance.179 In Colhn v. Smith,' 0 the Seventh Circuit invalidated a
175. See id at 258. Justice Frankfurter stated in the majority opinion: "The precise
question before us, then, is whether the protection of 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from punishing such libels-as criminal libel
has been defined, limited and constitutionally recognized time out of mind-directed at
designated collectives and flagrantly disseminated." In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black
stated that the majority "simply acts on the bland assumption that the First Amendment
is wholly irrelevant. It is not even accorded the respect of a passing mention." Id at 268
(Black, J., dissenting).
176. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1963).
177. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 n.3 (1964). The Court in Garrson
found no problem in stating that the first amendment applied to criminal, as well as civil,
libel cases. The reasons that allow the first amendment to apply to civil libel cases are of
no less force merely because the remedy is criminal. The constitutional guarantees of free
speech compel application of the same standard in criminal and civil libel cases. See id at
74.
178. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1966). The Ashton Court relied on
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), to support its decision that the first amendment
applies to criminal libel cases. The Court stated that: "a function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger." Ashton, 384 U.S. at 199-200 (quoting Termin~ello, 337 U.S. at
4).
179. See Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094-95 (8th Cir. 1973). For example,
in Tollett, the court reversed the defendant's conviction for mailing postcards containing
" 'scurrilous' and 'defamatory' language." Id at 1088. The court termed the history of
criminal libel statutes "ignominious," id. at 1094, and noted that it was extremely doubt-
ful that the Illinois statute considered in Beauharnais would be upheld today. Id at 1094
n. 14. Other decisions which have rejected the Beauharnai reasoning include Sambo's Res-
taurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 n.7 (6th Cir. 1981) (city enjoined
from denying restaurant owner's right to use trade name "Sambo's" even though there
was evidence that the name offended racial group); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied,
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Skokie, Illinois ordinance prohibiting the dissemination of materi-
als intending to promote hatred against persons on the basis of
their race, national origin, or religion.181 The court stated that its
decision was not governed by Beauhamas. 18 2 The Village of Sko-
kie's petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court was
denied, with two Justices dissenting.18 3 The sole reason given by
the dissenting Justices for wishing to grant certiorari was that the
Court should consider whether or not to formally overrule
Beauhamais. 1
4
This analysis illustrates that any attempt to justify a content-
based restriction on the basis of Beauharnazs is on extremely shaky
ground. Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have recognized that Beauhamais is no longer controlling when the
first amendment and libel are concerned.
The second reason Beauharnais lacks precedential value is that
since the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Tmes Co. v.
Sulh'van,'85 it is necessary for a plaintiff to plead and prove particu-
larized injuries in order to impose civil liability for defamation.1
8 6
The Court has held that the first amendment was violated by a
trial court construction that "an imputation of impropriety to one
or some of a small group that casts suspicion on all is actiona-
ble."' 8 7 In contrast to the general requirement of particularized
394 U.S. 930 (1969) (Federal Communications Commission's decision to review radio sta-
tion's license upheld in spite of fact that station had broadcast two programs causing
"group libel").
180. 578 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
181. Id at 1199. In Colln, members of the American Nazi Party brought an action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance. The ordi-
nance was enacted after the Nazis announced plans to march in front of the village hall in
Skokie, a Chicago suburb with a large Jewish population, including many survivors of the
Holocaust. Id
182. See id at 1203-05. In discussing the effect of Beauhamais, the court stated that:
[W]e agree with the district court that decisions. . . since Beauharnais have abro-
gated the Chapinsky dictum, made one of the premises of Beauharnais, that the
punishment of libel 'has never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem.' [New York Times Co. v. Sullivan] . . . and [Gertz v. Welch] . . . are indisputa-
ble evidence that libel does indeed now raise serious . . . First Amendment
problems, sufficient as a matter of constitutional law to require the substantial
rewriting of both criminal and civil state libel laws.
Id at 1205.
183. See Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White joined
with Mr. Justice Blackmun in the dissent. Id
184. Id at 919.
185. 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
186. See id; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1966).
187. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 80-82. In Rosenblatt, a supervisor of a county recreation
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damages, the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance would give a civil
cause of action to any woman simply because of pornography's
existence.' 88 The ordinance would grant this cause of action re-
gardless of whether the pornography created any particularized
injury with respect to her. This would violate first amendment
guarantees by undermining the particularization requirements set
forth by both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.189
B. The Clear and Present Danger Standard
The second exception to the protection of the first amendment is
for speech which involves a clear and present danger of inciting
unlawful conduct. Speech which presents a clear and present dan-
ger of bringing about "those substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent is exempt from first amendment coverage."' 19
While the clear and present danger standard is a recognized excep-
tion to the first amendment, application of this principle has been
extremely limited.
The Court has recognized that the clear and present danger
standard applies only in the narrowest of circumstances. Only if
speech is likely to incite imminent lawless action will censorship be
permitted.' 9' Such action must rise far above public inconven-
program sued a columnist for libel because of charges that speculation and mismanage-
ment had taken place in the supervisor's department.
This principle was more recently followed by district courts in Gintert v. Howard
Publications, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1983), and Michigan United Conservation
Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Both courts held that the first
amendment requires that defamation of a group gives rise to no cause of action, unless the
defamation is reasonably susceptible to specific application to the plaintiff himself. See
Gintert, 565 F. Supp. at 832 (group libel action not maintainable by members of lake com-
munity against newspaper which published series of demeaning articles regarding envi-
ronmental condition of community); Mfthtgan United Conservation Clubs, 485 F. Supp. at 898
(group libel action not maintainable by conservation club against television station for
airing degrading hunting program).
188. See Proposed Ordinance § 4, to add MCO 139.40(l)(3). Section (l)(3) gives
"[any woman.., a cause of action . . . as a woman acting against the subordination of
women." Id.
189. If the first amendment was violated by a civil cause of action as in Rosenblatt,
where all members of a particular governmental department who were accused of mis-
management were allowed to bring a cause of action, then extending that cause of action
to a group as large as all women cannot be constitutionally permissible.
190. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The Schenck decision
was the first to delineate the clear and present danger standard. For a history of the
standard, see NOWAK, supra note 52, at 874-86.
191. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); see also Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949) (holding that speech "may indeed best serve its high purpose
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ience, annoyance, or unrest. 192 Recent decisions make clear that
the danger of lawless action must be truly imminent, or no prohi-
bition can be made of such speech.
1 93
Despite extensive expert testimony on behalf of the ordinance
by various social scientists, no showing was made that the material
prohibited by the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is limited to
that which creates a threat of imminent unlawful conduct. Dr. Ed-
ward Donnerstein testified that exposure to violent pornography
created calloused attitudes toward women, and increased the trivi-
alization of rape and the acceptance of the rape myth. 194 He also
admitted, however, that these attitudes are reversible through a
debriefing process, whereby persons exposed to pornography are
dissuaded by the presentation of contrary ideas. 95 Moreover, the
notion that imminent lawless activity is fostered by pornography
was clearly disputed before the Pornography Task Force by re-
searchers Candace Kruttshnitt and Linda Heath.196 The study by
Ms. Kruttshnitt and Ms. Heath, comparing sex offenders with
members of the population at large from similar age and neighbor-
hood groups, revealed no substantial difference between the two
groups in terms of exposure to violent pornography.
197
Thus, even construing the evidence most favorably to the propo-
nents of the ordinance, no evidence exists to support the proposi-
tion that pornography causes imminent lawless conduct. At best,
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction . ..or even stirs people to
anger").
192. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4.
193. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973). In Hess, the Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction under an Indiana disorderly conduct statute, in a situa-
tion arising out of an anti-war demonstration on the campus of Indiana University.
During the demonstration between 100 and 150 demonstrators blocked a public street,
preventing the passage of motor vehicles. When the sheriff cleared the streets, he heard
the defendant state, "We'll take the fucking street later." Id. at 106-07. In holding that
this speech did not constitute an incitement to imminent unlawful activity, the Supreme
Court stated that the defendant's statement at best "could be taken as counsel for present
moderation," and at worst constituted "nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time." Id at 108. As such, the Court held the evidence insufficient
to establish that the advocacy was directed at producing "imminent" lawless behavior or
even that it was intended to produce "imminent" disorder. Id at 108-09.
194. See Minneapolis, Minn., Task Force on Pornography Minutes (Mar. 6, 1984) (on
file with the Minneapolis City Council) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Minutes].
195. Id.
196. See Task Force Minutes (Mar. 13, 1984) (on file with the Minneapolis City Coun-
cil). Ms. Kruttshnitt and Ms. Heath are researchers for the Criminal Offenders Project of
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exposure to pornography affects attitudes. However, these atti-
tudes can be reversed by exposure to opposing attitudes, support-
ing the Supreme Court's conclusion that the appropriate remedy is
more speech, not less.'19
C. Commercial Speech
The final exception to first amendment law advanced on behalf
of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is the commercial speech
exception. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,'99 the Court held that the first
amendment imposes no restraint on speech which consists of
"commercial advertising. ' '200 The precedential value of Valentne,
however, has been undermined by more recent decisions of the
Supreme Court which have accorded substantial first amendment
protection to commercial speech. 20'
Advocates of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance rely on Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission of Human Relations,20 2 in which
the Court upheld a human relations commission order directing a
newspaper to cease and desist placing "help wanted" advertise-
ments under columns labeled "Jobs-male interests," and "Jobs-fe-
male interests," in the face of a city ordinance prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment. 20 3 The Court in Pittsburgh Press Co.
198. See, e.g., Terminielo, 337 U.S. at 4; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 191.
199. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
200. Id. at 54.
201. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorneys may adver-
tise prices of routine services); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prescription drug prices may be advertised). In fact,
the very ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court in Valentine has been held unconstitu-
tional by New York State courts in light of Virginia State Bd of Pharmay. See People v.
Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 529-30, 355 N.E.2d 375, 377, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416-17 (1976)
(conviction for distributing jazz concert leaflets in public place reversed on grounds that
constitutionally protected commercial speech had been abridged).
202. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
203. Id at 378. The ordinance proscribed discrimination in employment on the basis
of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, place of birth, or sex. Section 8 of the
ordinance declared it to be an unlawful employment practice:
except where based upon a bona fide occupational exemption certified by the
Commission:
(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate
against any person with respect to hiring . . . because of ... sex.
(e) For any 'employer,' employment agency or labor organization to publish or
circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement
relating to 'employment' or membership which indicates any discrimination be-
cause of. . . sex.
(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor
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based its decision upon two factors, neither of which are present in
the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance.
First, the commercial speech involved in Pittsburgh Press Co. was
entitled to substantially less first amendment protection than
speech having to do with ideas. The Court specifically noted that
the advertisement "did no more than propose a commercial trans-
action. ' ' 2°4 In contrast, the material sought to be regulated by the
MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance goes far beyond material which
simply proposes commercial transactions. The crux of the pornog-
raphy definition in the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance has noth-
ing to do with proposing a commercial transaction. Rather, it
deals solely with the advocacy of ideas. 20 5 In Pittsburgh Press Co.,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that merely because speech
is sold at a profit, it becomes commercial and subject to regula-
tion.20 6 The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is not limited to
proposals of purely commercial transactions. It applies to all pub-
lished material that contains "pornography," regardless of
whether the material involves commercial advertising.20 7 Failure
to limit the scope of the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance to mate-
rial which proposes a commercial transaction limits any preceden-
tial value Pittsburgh Press Co. might otherwise have.
Second, the Pittsburgh Press Co. decision noted that the advertise-
ment in question not only proposed a commercial activity, but also
proposed an illegal commercial activity. Such illegal activity could
be regulated.208 The Court noted that, consistent with the first
amendment, a newspaper could be prohibited from publishing
commercial advertisements proposing the sale of narcotics or solic-
itation of prostitutes. 20 9 Although the illegality "may be less
overt," the Court saw no difference in principle between advertise-
organization, to aid . .. in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful
employment practice by this ordinance.
Id.
204. Id at 385.
205. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
206. 413 U.S. at 385. The Court stated:
If a newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its operation-
from the selection of news stories to the choice of editorial position-would be
subject to regulation if it could be established that they were conducted with a
view toward increased sales. Such a basis for regulation clearly would be incom-
patible with the First Amendment.
Id
207. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 1
3 9 .2 0(gg).
208. 413 U.S. at 388. The illegal commercial activity proposed by the advertisements
was sexual discrimination in violation of the ordinance. Id; see supra note 203.
209. 413 U.S. at 388.
[Vol. I I
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ments inviting the sale of narcotics or solicitation of prostitutes,
and sexually discriminatory job advertisements.
2 10
Pittsburgh Press Co. holds that in the area of commercial transac-
tions, government can prohibit the publication of direct invita-
tions to engage in commercial transactions which are unlawful.
However, the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance is not so restricted.
Its prohibitions encompass far more than invitations to commer-
cial activities which are unlawful by nature. The ordinance is not
restricted to purely commercial transactions and is not restricted
to invitations to engage in unlawful commercial activity. 21' As
such, the ordinance falls outside the scope of the commercial
speech exception to the first amendment.
VIII. THE ORDINANCE AND PRIOR RESTRAINT
The MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance authorizes an administra-
tive restraint on the exhibition and distribution of materials pre-
sumptively entitled to first amendment protection.21 2 In the event
that a complaint is brought, the director of the Minneapolis Civil
Rights Commission determines whether probable cause exists to
believe pornography is involved.2 1 3 If probable cause is found, an
administrative hearing is held before a hearing committee. 21 4 If
the committee determines the material to be pornography, it may
order the material barred from public distribution. The distribu-
tor or exhibitor must then affirmatively seek relief from that order
in court. 215
Such a procedure violates well-established law governing ad-
ministrative restraints on first amendment activity. In Freedman v.
Magland,216 the Supreme Court declared that whenever adminis-
trative restraints on first amendment rights are authorized, a four-
fold procedural safeguard must be implemented.21 7 First, the ad-
ministrative agency imposing the restraint must grant or deny per-
mission to engage in the first amendment activity within the
210. Id. at 388-89.
211. See Proposed Ordinance § 3, to add MCO § 139.20(gg).
212. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
216. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
217. Id. at 58-59.
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briefest possible time. 218 Second, in order for the activity to be
restrained, the statute must require the administrative officer in-
volved to institute proceedings for a temporary or permanent in-
junction.219 Third, any restraint imposed in advance of final
judicial determination on the merits must be limited by law to the
preservation of the status quo for the shortest possible fixed pe-
riod. 220  Finally, a prompt, final judicial determination must be
assured.2 21 These procedural safeguards have been held necessary
whenever administrative restraints on first amendment activity are
imposed.
222
Whatever doubt may have existed about the scope of the re-
quirements developed in Freedman was put to rest by Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad 223 The Court restated and affirmed the
requirements of Freedman, and applied them in the broader context
of speech in a public forum. 224 Consequently, numerous federal
courts have held that the Freedman procedural safeguards must be
218. Id at 59. The time period for granting or denying permission to engage in the
activity must be specified in the statute or ordinance which allows review. See id at 60.
219. Ste id at 58. The statute or ordinance must specify a time period within which
the administrative proceedings must be brought. Id at 59. The administrative officer
instituting the proceedings assumes the burden of proof that the material cannot be re-
strained. Id at 58.
220. Id. at 59.
221. Id at 59-60 (Maryland statute did not provide assurance of prompt judicial
determination).
. 222. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (proce-
dural safeguards required when action was brought against musical production showing
in municipal theatre); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (safeguards required when
restriction placed on obscene materials sent by mail); United States v. Thirty-Seven Pho-
tographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971) (seizure of imported obscene material required imposi-
tion of Freedman standards); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1968)
(motion picture shown in public place was protected by Freedman standards). See generally
Blasi, tfor Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481 (1970) (demonstration regu-
lation should be subject to Freedman standards); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process,"
83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970) (judicial determination regarding protected character of
speech must either precede or immediately follow any governmental determination of
obscenity).
223. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
224. Id at 559-62. The Court stated:
The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint 'avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dan-
gers of a censorship system.'
If a scheme that restricts access to the mails must furnish the procedural safe-
guards set forth in Freedman, no less must be expected of a system that regulates
use of a public forum. Respondents here had the same power of licensing and
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present in laws which require official permission or authorization
as a condition precedent for first amendment activity.2 25 In Min-
nesota, the United States District Court has held that the absence
of the Freedman procedural due process safeguards would invalidate
an entire administrative system of prior restraint on adult
bookstores.
2 26
Judged by the Freedman standards, the procedural safeguards
provided by the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance are inadequate.
The ordinance contains no guarantee of a prompt determination
by either the director or the review committee as to the entitle-
ment of materials to first amendment protection. 227 If the review
committee determined a work to be pornography, it could issue an
immediate administrative ban. This would place the burden upon
the exhibitor, distributor, seller, or publisher to obtain judicial re-
lief from that ban.2 28 The ordinance also contains no provision
requiring the Department of Civil Rights to assume the burden of
proof in the administrative proceedings. Finally, the ordinance
provides no guarantee of a prompt judicial determination. Thus,
even if the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance were substantively
constitutional, its failure to provide the procedural due process
necessary under Freedman means that it must be invalidated.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to examine the MacKinnon/Dworkin ordinance
and find a substantive or procedural principle of the first amend-
ment which it does not violate. Its definition of pornography is
based solely upon an objection to the content of ideas. The defini-
tion is overbroad and encompasses materials entitled to constitu-
tional protection. The definition is also unconstitutionally vague.
225. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d
263, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (Freedman safeguards must be present in regulations promul-
gated by the aviation commission concerning distribution of literature in municipal air-
port); Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (city ordinance
regulating solicitation by non-profit religious organizations in city airport must contain
Freedman safeguards); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 873 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(regulations which require permit before person is able to solicit religious business on fed-
eral property must contain "criteria that are narrow, and strict, definitive and objective");
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 456 F. Supp. 473, 443-44
(S.D. Ind. 1978) (state fair regulations which lacked Freedman safeguards and limited reli-
gious group to solicitation from booth constituted prior restraint).
226. See Wendling v. City of Duluth, 495 F. Supp. 1380, 1386-87 (D. Minn. 1980).
227. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
228. MCO § 141.50 (1982).
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The exemption of libraries results in a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. The cause of action for rape or sexual assault
caused by pornography plainly adopts standards of liability which
have been rejected by the United States Supreme Court for
twenty-seven years. The absence of scienter further chills constitu-
tionally protected speech. Even assuming the entire ordinance to
be substantively constitutional, procedural deficiencies would re-
quire invalidation. The ordinance and the arguments advanced in
favor of it are "absurd and fanciful.
'229
Civil rights and censorship are indeed incompatible bedfellows.
The incompatibility arises out of a mistaken notion as to precisely
what constitutes civil rights in a free society. As offensive as por-
nography may be to some, there is not and there cannot be, in a
free society, a right not to be offended. As one judge has noted, "It
may . . . be well to remember that often 'words die away, and
flow off like water-leaving no taste, no color, no smell, not a
trace.' Any exception, however, to the First Amendment . . .
would not 'die away.' It would remain a dangerous and unman-
ageable precedent in our free and open society."
230
229. People v. Nitti, 312 I11. 73, 81, 94 (1924).
230. Collin, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (1978) (Wood, J., concurring) (quoting A. Solzhenit-
syn, Nobel Lecture (1972) (footnote omitted)).
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